South Sudan’s post-independence ordeal: fifteen years of conflict, political instability and humanitarian crises

Juba – South Sudan is the world’s youngest State. It is also one of the most troubled.
These days mark the fifteenth anniversary of its independence, achieved in 2011 following a referendum. Independence represented the culmination of a struggle that had begun in the 1950s. Only in 2005 was a peace agreement reached between Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and John Garang, leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army. At the root of that conflict there were religious differences, and not only that: Sudan had a Muslim majority, whilst South Sudan had a Christian majority,
and many in the South accused the government in Khartoum of seeking to impose Arab culture and the Arabic language throughout the country. After decades of war, 99 per cent of those who took part in the referendum voted to secede from Khartoum. It appeared that a new chapter was about to begin, but hopes for lasting peace quickly faded.
By 2013, the country had plunged into crisis. In July of that year, President Salva Kiir dismissed Vice President Riek Machar in an attempt to consolidate his power. Five months later, fighting erupted between forces loyal to the two leaders, largely along ethnic lines: Kiir belongs to the Dinka community, while Machar is a Nuer. A peace agreement signed in 2015 briefly eased tensions and allowed Machar to return after two years of exile. However, the agreement fell through, forcing the parties back to the negotiating table. The negotiations led to a series of ceasefires between 2017 and 2018, all of which were violated by both parties. Finally, a peace agreement was reached in 2018 with the mediation of Uganda. The agreement provided for the formation of a national unity government and the holding of elections. The problem was that in both cases, the deadlines were postponed for years.
The national unity government was established only in 2020 after two postponements, while elections, initially scheduled for 2023, are now expected to take place at the end of this year. The political situation deteriorated again in 2025 when civil war resumed and Vice President Machar was placed under house arrest. As the Council of Foreign Relations has observed, Machar’s detention effectively brought the 2018 peace agreement to an end.
The current fighting is concentrated in Jonglei State, Warrap State and Upper Nile State. Violence is being perpetrated by the two factions, which are themselves divided among various armed groups representing the country’s ethnic diversity. On July 1, the Transitional National Assembly voted on amendments removing the requirement to draft a permanent constitution before elections. The move has been widely interpreted as an attempt by President Kiir to further consolidate his grip on power, a decision likely to deepen the conflict between the two military factions. Should the current deadlock continue, with no political-military settlement in sight, serious questions remain over whether elections can realistically be organized by the end of the year and what outcome they could ultimately produce.
According to some analysts, the civil conflict in South Sudan is also fueled by the conflict tearing Sudan apart. In particular, transnational oil flows – with oil extracted in South Sudan and refined in Sudan – are said to play a role in this spillover effect.
Oil extraction represents South Sudan’s principal source of revenue, while Sudan relies heavily on transit revenues. As long as both countries remain engulfed in civil conflict, control over these strategic resources is likely to remain at the center of the fighting among competing armed groups, further aggravating the economic and humanitarian crises affecting both nations.
South Sudan’s humanitarian emergency is now second only to that of neighboring Sudan and is being fueled not only by conflict but also by the growing impact of climate change. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs , around two-thirds of the country’s population, approximately 10 million people, will require humanitarian assistance in 2026.
Among the most pressing challenges is the worsening food crisis. OCHA warns that food insecurity is expected to deteriorate further by the end of the year, with the number of people facing acute food insecurity likely to rise beyond the current of eight million.

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