Judge bans statues of St. Florian, Michael the Archangel from public safety building

There is controversy in Massachusetts, led by the American Civil Liberties Union, with Americans United for Separation of Church and State and the Freedom From Religion Foundation. These organizations sued the City of Quincy and its mayor, Thomas P. Koch, on behalf of residents over the proposed placement of statues of Saint Florian and Michael the Archangel, widely recognized symbols of protection for first responders, on a new public safety headquarters building.

After a trial court granted the requested injunction, Massachusetts’ highest court agreed to hear a direct appeal to decide the fate of the statues.

Given the far-reaching questions Fitzmaurice v. City of Quincy raises about freedom of religion in the public “marketplace of ideas,” this column reviews its background and the trial court’s order before offering analysis and commentary on its significance.

Background to Fitzmaurice v. City of Quincy

City of Quincy began after Mayor Koch ordered two ten-foot bronze statues of Florian and Michael the Archangel from Italy in early February 2025 to be installed on the city’s new public safety headquarters at a cost, to date, of $850,000. Koch testified that their “selection” “had nothing to do with Catholic sainthood.”

The statue of Florian, a fourth-century Roman soldier and Christian martyr who pioneered firefighting brigades, depicts him pouring water on a burning building. The Archangel Michael statue, who is associated with defense against evil, displays angel wings while holding a shield as he vanquishes a demon.

Both figures are identified worldwide with firefighters and police, reflecting their depictions in Western art for centuries.

As hundreds of city residents opposed the plan, on April 4, 2025, leaders of nineteen local faith groups “express[ed] ‘grave concerns’” about the statues. Conversely, on January 5, 2026, though, supporters rallied in favor of the statues.

On May 5, 2025, the ACLU sued the city and the mayor in his official capacity on behalf of fifteen residents objecting to the statues as violating prohibitions against religion in Article 3 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, (discussed below).

The plaintiffs further alleged that seeing the statues by driving past them or if they had to enter the building, “go[es] against [their] beliefs” while “send[ing] an exclusionary message to non-Catholics…mak[ing them] feel excluded.”

The plaintiffs added that Koch planned for the statues without notifying the city council or the public.

Trial Court Opinion

In granting the ACLU’s motion for a preliminary injunction on October 14, 2025, the judge largely grounded his order in 1971’s Lemon v. Kertzman. Under Lemon, governmental action must “[f]irst have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”

The judge applied Lemon even while acknowledging that the Supreme Court clearly repudiated it in 2022’s Kennedy v. Bremerton, upholding the rights of a football coach in Washington to pray on the field after games. The Justices reasoned that “this Court long ago abandoned Lemon…,” explaining that “the Establishment Clause must be interpreted in ‘reference to historical practices and understandings.’”

The judge applied Lemon because Massachusetts’ highest court continues to do so. The judge, again ignoring the defendant’s First Amendment rights, refused to apply Kennedy because “[s]uch a result is incompatible with our State constitutional provisions.”

In granting the injunction, the judge thought that the plaintiffs would succeed because the statues had the primary effect of advancing religion and could cause political divisiveness. The judge then feared that some “[v]ictims and witnesses entering such a building often must overcome emotional and psychological hurdles,” worrying “whether the police will treat their claims with the gravity warranted and treat them equally as any other individual, regardless of religious beliefs.”

The judge thereby decreed that because the plaintiffs might suffer irreparable injury if the statues were erected, they were entitled to an injunction.

Dissatisfied with the outcome, the city and Koch, with support from a dozen organizations that submitted friend-of the court-briefs, requested a direct appeal from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts so the case did not first have to go before an intermediate appellate panel.

The court heard oral arguments on May 6, 2026, and should render a judgment before too long.

Analysis and Commentary

It is worth reflecting on the status of the statues of Saint Florian and Archangel Michael, who, in particular, is “represented in scripture in Jewish, Muslim, and various Christian traditions.” As the brief of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, the highly successful “non-profit, public-interest legal and educational institute with a mission to protect the free expression of all faiths,” representing Koch and the city highlights, depictions of saints revered by the Catholic Church and other faith traditions are frequently displayed in public spaces across Massachusetts and the Nation.

As evidence of the widespread use of religious statues, Moses is displayed in Boston’s John Adams Courthouse, David is in the Massachusetts State House, and Saint Pope John Paul II is on Boston Common. Further, many displays of religious figures, including Muhammad, King Solomon, and Moses, are in the United States Supreme Court, while the Capitol’s Statuary Hall exhibits such diverse faith-based figures as Brigham Young, Billy Graham, and two Catholic saints, Fathers Junipero Serra and Damien of Molokai.

Regardless of what one thinks of the figures displayed in these statues, they have often assumed secular, rather than religious-devotional, roles as artwork worldwide.

The trial court judge ignored both basic principles of constitutional law and clear Supreme Court precedent by finding in favor of the plaintiffs. What the judge missed, or perhaps ignored, is that Mayor Koch and the city have an unmistakable First Amendment right to religious freedom according to which “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”

Ignoring the primacy of federal law, the judge failed to apply the First Amendment in City of Quincy, even though it applies because the Justices extended it to the states in the 1940s Cantwell v. Connecticut. In Cantwell, the County invalidated the convictions of Jehovah’s Witnesses for violating a local statute against soliciting funds for religious, charitable, or philanthropic purposes without prior approval of public officials because the First Amendment takes precedence over state law.

Equally important, the judge ignored Supreme Court precedent from 2020’s Espinoza v. Montana in relying on Article 3 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights’ assertion that “all religious sects and denominations, demeaning themselves peaceably, and as good citizens of the commonwealth, shall be equally under the protection of the law; and no subordination of any one sect or denomination to another shall ever be established by law.”

Yet, neither the plaintiffs nor the judge could identify a single case from Massachusetts relying on this language to prohibit a passive display of public art, such as the issue here, due to its perceived religious significance.

Espinoza is crucial because even though it addressed the denial of neutral, generally available aid in the form of a tax credit program for parents and others to contribute to student scholarship organizations under the state constitutional prohibition of public aid to “sectarian” schools, it enunciated a principle directly applicable in City of Quincy.

In other words, the judge somehow missed, or maybe ignored, that just as the Supreme Court explained in Espinoza, because Montana could not separate religion and the government more strictly than the Federal Constitution in invalidating the tax credit program, neither could the plaintiffs rely on Massachusetts’ Declaration of Rights to limit the defendants’ Federal Free Exercise rights by banning the statues.

Another troubling aspect of City of Quincy is the attitude of the plaintiffs. For instance, while the named plaintiff identified in the ACLU’s complaint left the Catholic Church as a child, even though she claims its teachings still inform some of her beliefs, she still opposed the statues. Another plaintiff “was frightened by the existence and planned installation of these statues,” worrying that minority faiths are ignored.

It is difficult to understand how these plaintiffs refused to respect the diversity of religious freedom rights of Americans with whom they disagree or differ.

The final confounding element in City of Quincy concerns the trial court judge’s attitude towards and comments about the police. The judge expressed fear that the two passive, minimally religious statues serving as symbols of support for first responders who voluntarily risk their lives for others, rather than as devotional in nature, might, without evidence, motivate police officials to neglect their duties. It is unfortunate that the judge apparently thought so little of the police that, absent any justification, he questioned their integrity and commitment to their duties because of the possible presence of the statues.

I plan to write a follow-up when Massachusetts’ highest court rules, so stay tuned.

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